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Abstract
When subject to the choice-blindness effect, an agent gives reasons for making 
choice B, moments after making the alternative choice A. Choice blindness has 
been studied in a variety of contexts, from consumer choice and aesthetic judgement 
to moral and political attitudes. The pervasiveness and robustness of the effect is 
regarded as powerful evidence of self-ignorance. Here we compare two interpreta-
tions of choice blindness. On the choice error interpretation, when the agent gives 
reasons she is in fact wrong about what her choice is. On the choice change inter-
pretation, when the agent gives reasons she is right about what her choice is, but she 
does not realise that her choice has changed. In this paper, we spell out the impli-
cations of the two interpretations of the choice-blindness effect for self-ignorance 
claims and offer some reasons to prefer choice change to choice error.
Keywords Self-knowledge · Choice blindness · Decision making · Consumer 
choices · Moral attitudes · Political attitudes · Ignorance
1  Choice errors, choice changes, and confabulation
The choice-blindness effect has been studied in a variety of contexts, from consumer 
choice and aesthetic judgement to moral and political attitudes, by Petter Johansson, 
Lars Hall, and their colleagues at the Choice Blindness Lab (e.g., Hall and Johans-
son 2009; Hall et al. 2010, 2012, 2013; Johansson et al. 2006, 2008; Strandberg et al. 
2018). The most common way to characterise the surprising results of the applica-
tion of the choice-blindness paradigm is to say that, due to experimental manipula-
tion, an agent can sincerely provide articulate and convincing reasons for a choice 
she did not make, and this is particularly striking because the choice defended with 
reasons is in tension with the choice the agent actually made just moments earlier.
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Choice blindness is often described as a form of confabulation. When people 
confabulate, they tell a story that they believe to be correct, for instance, a story 
about why they made a certain choice, but the story is not grounded in the evi-
dence (Turner and Coltheart 2010; Hirsten 2005; Bortolotti 2018). That is because 
people are not aware of some of the causal factors responsible for their choice. 
Clearly, there are important similarities between confabulation and choice blindness, 
and both phenomena have been discussed in the philosophical literature to argue for 
the limitations of self-knowledge claims.
However, in this paper we do not address confabulation head-on (we do so else-
where, such as in Bortolotti 2018 and Sullivan-Bissett 2015). The main reason is 
that we believe that the phenomena of confabulation and choice blindness are sig-
nificantly different (as we explain in Sect. 3). In confabulation Anna chooses choco-
late ice-cream because her sister did, but when she is asked about her choice, she 
explains it by appealing to different reasons, e.g., that chocolate is her favourite ice-
cream flavour. There is no doubt that Anna is aware of what her choice was, but 
what she gets wrong is the causal process leading to her choice. Anna confabulates 
reasons for her choice.
In choice blindness Anna is asked by her mum whether she wants vanilla ice-
cream or chocolate ice-cream and she says: “Chocolate”. Her mum mishears her 
and replies: “Vanilla is an excellent choice, my dear. Why did you choose it?” Anna 
answers that vanilla is a more delicate flavour than chocolate.1 Now, it is not clear 
whether Anna knows what her choice was, because she seems to consent to her 
mum’s incorrect choice attribution and, further, provides reasons for a choice that is 
different from the choice she explicitly made.
In the second scenario, to say that Anna confabulates reasons for her choice does 
not sound right. Rather, there are two ways in which we can describe what happens 
to Anna.2 She either attributes to herself (and gives reasons for) a choice she did 
not make, ignoring what her ‘real’ choice was (choice error); or she makes two dif-
ferent choices in quick succession, and she only gives reasons for the latter (choice 
change). Not only is the challenge to self-knowledge different in the two scenarios—
as confabulation does not threaten the correctness of one’s choice attribution but 
simply the groundedness of the explanation provided for it—but it is also unclear in 
what respect choice blindness involves confabulating reasons.
We may wonder whether it matters if we are choice-blind. It is difficult to over-
estimate the value of choice in our personal and public lives. To a large extent, we 
identify ourselves (and other people identify us) with our choices, from the choice of 
an occupation to the choice of a life partner, from the choice of where to live, to the 
1 It is possible that in some real-life examples similar to the one described, a child confirms what her 
mother says not to contradict her or disappoint her—as may happen when we do what is expected of us 
for reasons related to social conformity or social desirability. For the example to be an example of choice 
blindness we need to assume that Anna offers what she regards as a genuine explanation for her choice 
when she explains to her mother why she chose vanilla.
2 We do not rule out that alternative interpretations could be offered for the scenario. The two interpreta-
tions we introduce here and elaborate in the rest of the paper reflect the views currently discussed in the 
choice blindness literature.
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choice of which party to vote for at the next political election. It is presumed that the 
choices we make reveal important features of our character and worldview. For all 
sorts of reasons, we are not always in a position to turn our preferences into choices, 
but the assumption is that, when we have the opportunity to do so, we manifest who 
we are in the choices we make. And other people respond to us—with admiration 
or condemnation—largely on the basis of the preferences that are reflected in our 
choices.
The role of choice in our personal and public lives would be greatly undermined 
if we were shown to attribute to ourselves choices we never made and defend them 
with reasons (choice error). It would also be unsettling to realise that our preferences 
can change dramatically in the space of a few moments as a result of manipulation, 
causing inconsistency between past and future choices (choice change). The discov-
ery that our behaviour can be easily manipulated is unwelcome in either case, but 
in this paper we ask what exactly we are manipulated into doing, and whether we 
exhibit self-ignorance when we are choice blind.3
In choice error, we are manipulated into misattributing choices to ourselves, and 
in choice change we are manipulated into reversing our choices. If we were mis-
taken about what our choices are, then other people would be justified in questioning 
whether choices really are a clue to the kind of people we are. If we were ignorant 
about our choices, this would show that choices are not (always) reliable surface 
manifestations of our ‘deeper selves’. If, however, we were manipulated into revers-
ing our choices in the space of minutes, then it is not our claim to self-knowledge as 
such that would be threatened, but our stability and coherence as agents. We would 
not fail to realise what our choices are, but we would still fail to realise that our 
choices changed. Measures to prevent manipulation would need to be significantly 
different in the two cases: in choice error, we would need to avoid failures of self-
knowledge by enhancing our capacity to recognise and remember which choices we 
made and keep track of the preferences that justify those choices; in choice change, 
we would need to avoid behavioural inconsistencies by resisting inaccurate third-
party attributions and enhancing our stability and coherence.
In this paper, we make a case for the choice change interpretation of at least some 
of the experimental results on choice blindness. We are not arguing that choice 
change is always the best interpretation of the experimental results of the choice-
blindness studies. However, we establish that choice change is a serious contender 
and provide some reasons to prefer this interpretation to the dominant interpretation, 
choice error, in at least some cases. We hope this will prompt future empirical work 
in this area to shed some light on how common the phenomenon of choice change 
might be and on how it can be distinguished from choice error. In general, our view 
3 The term ‘choice blind’ is a little unfortunate given that we are interested in the correct interpretation 
of the results from studies using this term (on the choice change interpretation, there’s a sense in which 
we are not blind to our choices after all). Throughout the paper we will follow the literature in using the 
term ‘choice blind’ but note here that we intend it to be neutral between the choice error and the choice 
change interpretation. The term as used by us merely picks out the phenomenon identified by results.
 Synthese
1 3
is that the experimental results collected under the umbrella of choice blindness may 
well resist neat classification under a single interpretation.
In Sect. 2, we offer an example of what choice blindness may look like out of the 
lab, showing how the phenomenon, just like confabulation, has been taken to chal-
lenge the intuitive connection between defending a choice with reasons and having 
knowledge of that choice.
In Sect.  3, we briefly discuss how earlier studies on consumer choice and atti-
tude shifts relate to the choice-blindness studies. Studies on choice blindness were 
devised as a refinement and development of the previous work on introspection 
effects, although the phenomenon they target is not the mere fact that we tend to 
confabulate reasons for our choices.
In Sect. 4, we focus on choice blindness for moral and political attitudes, flesh-
ing out in more detail the two interpretations of choice blindness; choice error and 
choice change. We suggest that the studies in moral and political attitudes lend 
themselves particularly well to the choice change interpretation.
In Sect. 5, we discuss some reasons in favour of the choice change interpretation 
and ask whether it is in tension with one of the findings of the choice-blindness stud-
ies, that reasons cement preferences. We conclude by reflecting on the implications 
of the choice change interpretation for claims about self-ignorance.
2  Choices misattributed or changed?
In some of the philosophical literature on self-knowledge (e.g., Moran 2001), an 
agent’s capacity to give reasons for a belief or choice is claimed to suggest that the 
agent authors that belief or choice, in the sense that she has a special, first-personal 
way to know what her belief or choice is, via the reasons she has for endorsing it as 
her own. The authorship model of self-knowledge has been challenged on the basis 
of the results of psychological studies on introspection effects, with philosophers 
arguing that we come to know what our minds are largely in the same way as a third 
person would, by interpreting our behaviour which is a fallible exercise, prone to 
biases (Carruthers 2005); and that in some circumstances a third person is in a better 
position to know what really goes on in our minds than ourselves (Lawlor 2003).4
In choice blindness (as in some of the other empirical challenges to the power 
of introspection and first-person authority) the connection between reason giving 
and self-knowledge is an explicit target. When we endorse with reasons a choice we 
made, we ascribe to ourselves preferences that justify that choice. If we endorse with 
reasons a choice we never made ascribing to ourselves preferences we do not have, 
then the role of reason giving in securing authorship and privileged access to our 
choices is under threat. Let’s see how this works with an example.
Suppose that Helena wants to buy a new dress for her friend’s cocktail party. In 
the shop, she tries on both a blue dress and a grey dress and chooses the blue dress 
because it is brighter. We can say that the reason Helena chose the blue dress is 
4 For a more detailed account of this exchange please see Bortolotti (2009) and Bortolotti (2018).
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because she has a preference for wearing a brighter dress at her friend’s party. Now 
suppose that at the till the shop assistant makes a mistake and places the grey dress 
in Helena’s shopping bag instead of the blue dress. When Helena gets home, she 
opens the bag and finds the grey dress in it. She comes to believe that she chose 
the grey dress and she explains her alleged choice to her flatmate by saying that the 
grey dress is more elegant than the blue dress she tried on in the shop. We would 
normally believe that the fact that Helena can give reasons for her choice—reporting 
with honesty and conviction why she preferred one dress rather than the other—is 
evidence for the claim that she is fully aware of what her choice was and she authors 
it, ascribing a preference to herself that guided her action. But in this scenario the 
fact that Helena can give reasons for choosing the grey dress does not seem, after 
all, to provide evidence for the claim that Helena is aware of what her choice was 
and that she is the author of that choice.
Helena is choice-blind. The standard interpretation of the choice-blindness 
studies is that, due to manipulation, agents are likely to (1) misidentify what their 
choices are and (2) attribute to themselves preferences they do not have but that 
justify the choices they mistakenly identify as theirs. Seen in this light, the choice-
blindness phenomenon involves two errors that can be characterised as misattribu-
tions: Helen cannot tell either what choice she made in the shop or what preferences 
she has about the sort of dress she should wear at her friend’s cocktail party. In this 
interpretation, choice-blindness studies threaten the idea that, by giving articulate 
and convincing reasons for choosing A over B, people come to know about their 
choices in a first-personal (distinctive and authoritative) way.
There is an alternative interpretation of the experimental results of the choice-
blindness studies which deserves more attention than it has received so far. It says 
that, when agents give articulate reasons for making a choice, they may fail to track 
their earlier choices but they do not misattribute choices to themselves, and they 
correctly report their current preferences. Rather, their choice changed as a result of 
the experimental manipulation.5 The prediction is that, if they were asked again to 
choose between the same items they were shown before, participants would commit 
to a different choice from the choice they originally made (this prediction is con-
firmed in one of the choice blindness studies, Hall and Johansson 2008, as we shall 
discuss later). After giving reasons for allegedly choosing the grey dress, if Helena 
were back in the shop facing the blue and the grey dress again, she would choose the 
grey dress.
So, agents correctly report their preferences at the time of offering reasons, and 
by offering reasons for choice B they commit to a choice that is different from the 
one they made earlier, choice A—the fact that they offer reasons for choice B may 
also make it more likely that they will stick to that choice should they be asked to 
make the same or a similar choice in the future. Thus, although choice B is not a 
choice they ever explicitly made, it can affect their future decision making. The idea 
is that the choices change as a result of what agents believe they chose (Lopes 2014: 
5 This interpretation of Johansson et  al. (2005) study on choosing faces is given by Lopes (2014: pp. 
29–30).
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p. 30). In this second interpretation, agents are still blind to something: they are not 
blind to what their choices are but to the fact that their choices changed and to the 
reason why they changed.
Thus, in either interpretation subjects exhibit ignorance: in choice error, they 
are ignorant about their choices; in choice change, they are ignorant about their 
change of choices and about the factors contributing to their choice changing. That 
is because agents do not realise that a manipulation took place, and that the choices 
they defended with reasons are an effect of their beliefs about what they chose, 
which in turn are a result of such manipulation.
Independent of the interpretation we adopt, the phenomenon is puzzling and 
reveals a vulnerability to manipulation whose extent we might have not imagined 
without appreciating the results of the choice-blindness studies. However, we will 
argue that in the choice change interpretation the agents’ behaviour is no longer an 
obvious threat to self-knowledge intended as correct self-attribution. The agent in 
the manipulated condition makes choice A first, but—when B is presented to her 
as her own choice—she endorses B by providing reasons for choosing B. The agent 
prefers B to A at the time of justifying choice B, but she does not realise that the 
choice she is defending is not the choice she originally made, and that her choice has 
changed as a result of the experimenters manipulating her beliefs about her choices.
Given that either account of choice blindness raises serious concerns from an 
epistemic point of view, adopting the latter interpretation does not lead to an apol-
ogy of human agency or a rationalisation of agents’ behaviour. On the choice change 
interpretation, it is hard to avoid concluding that our choices are fickle and bound to 
change for no good reason.
3  Introspection effects and choice blindness
There is copious psychological research disclosing the ills of reason giving. In some 
contexts, when we give reasons, we offer ill-grounded explanations for questionable 
consumer choices (Nisbett and Wilson 1977); or we shift our attitudes towards our 
romantic relationships (Wilson and Kraft 1993), endorsing attitudes that are not pre-
dictive of our future behaviour.
3.1  Consumer choice
In the now classic study by Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson (1977), partici-
pants are asked to explain their consumer choices (either a choice between iden-
tical pairs of socks or a choice between slightly different nightgowns). When 
asked why they made their choice, participants answer by appealing to (what 
they took to be) features of the items, such as the socks having a better colour or 
the nightgown being softer. However, the choice was influenced by the position 
of the items: the chosen item was typically on the right-hand side of the person 
making the choice. According to Nisbett and Wilson, people are not aware of 
some of the cognitive processes underlying their choices (priming effects) and 
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come up with reasons for those choices based on plausibility considerations. In 
the study, if the reasons given are intended as an explanation for the choices, 
participants offer ill-grounded explanations. The explanations are ill-grounded 
because the facts to be explained did not occur for the reasons identified by the 
participants: one can safely infer from the experimental design that people did 
not choose the items for colour or texture but for their relative position.
In the philosophical literature, the results of the Nisbett and Wilson study and 
other studies on introspection effects have been conceived as a threat to self-
knowledge, as is evident in the work by Peter Carruthers (2005), Robin Scaife 
(2014), and Krista  Lawlor (2003). Yet, the studies do not show that partici-
pants misattribute choices to themselves. Rather, they show that participants are 
not able to identify the causal factors leading them to make a certain choice. 
Whether the evidence undermines self-knowledge claims depends on what we 
take self-knowledge to be. If the correct self-attribution of choices is sufficient 
for self-knowledge, then the participants’ self-knowledge is not compromised. 
If self-knowledge requires not only correct self-attribution of choices, but also 
knowledge of how one’s choices came about, then participants’ self-knowledge 
is under threat (Bortolotti 2009, 2018).
In one of the choice-blindness studies on consumer choice (Hall et al. 2010), 
people were asked  to sample two varieties of jam and choose their favourite. 
Moments later, participants were asked to sample (what was presented as) their 
preferred jam again and explain why they chose it. Experimenters manipulated 
the second sampling so that for their second tasting people were offered not 
the jam they just chose, but the one that they just rejected. Most people did not 
detect the switch and provided convincing reasons for the choice that was pre-
sented to them as theirs, even when the flavour of the two jams was very differ-
ent, such as cinnamon-apple and grapefruit.
Despite the explicit intent of the choice-blindness paradigm to extend the 
results of the classic Nisbett and Wilson study, the phenomena involved are 
significantly different. In the choice-blindness experiment people are asked to 
explain a manipulated choice, say, for cinnamon-apple jam, when they originally 
chose grapefruit jam. When the agent gives reasons for choosing the cinnamon-
apple jam, she is either (1) ascribing to herself a preference that she does not 
have, misidentifying her choice (choice error); or (2) ascribing to herself gen-
uine preferences that she acquired as a result of the manipulation and signal-
ling (choice change). The main difference between the two interpretations lies in 
whether the agent ‘changed her mind’ in the course of the experiment.
In the original introspection-effect studies, participants were asked to give 
reasons for the only choice that they had explicitly made. Participants neither 
misattributed their choices nor changed them—the focus was on whether the 
explanation of their choices reflected the factors determining their choices. As 
the choice-blindness paradigm raises questions about whether we misattribute 
choices to ourselves or whether our choices change, its focus is different from 
that of the original Nisbett and Wilson study.
 Synthese
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3.2  Dual attitudes
The phenomenon of dual attitudes has been observed in several contexts, but here 
we shall focus on the attitudes people have towards their romantic relationships 
(Seligman et al. 1980; Wilson and Kraft 1993; Wilson et al. 1989; Ivan 2013). In 
one study (Wilson and Kraft 1993), participants were asked to assess the relation-
ships with the people they were dating. Then, they were divided into two groups, 
and at the end they were asked for their attitudes once more, and for a prediction 
about the future of their relationships. In group 1, the intermediate task was to list 
reasons for the success or failure of the relationship. In group 2, participants were 
given a different, unrelated task.
Results showed that those participants who were asked for reasons for their 
relationship appraisals experienced an attitude shift. The reasons the participants 
offered did not support the attitudes they initially reported, and when participants 
were asked to assess the relationship again, their assessment differed from the one 
they initially gave. The experimenters’ conclusion was that thinking about reasons 
brought about new attitudes that were significantly different from those initially 
reported. One interesting question is whether the new attitudes were likely to be 
reflected in the participants’ long-term behaviour. In a study which included a fol-
low-up interview, Wilson et al. (1984) found that participants who evaluated their 
relationship and made a prediction about it without being asked for reasons made 
more successful predictions than the participants who were asked for reasons.
Why do people change their minds about the success and quality of their relation-
ships when they are asked for reasons for their relationship appraisals? One hypoth-
esis is that, when people are asked to assess their relationship at the start of the 
experiment, they express how they feel at the time. But when they provide reasons 
for their attitudes, they mention facts about their relationships that are readily avail-
able to them and easy to report and share. So, people attend to different aspects of 
their relationships in the course of the experiment. As a result of the reason-giving 
task, it is possible that new attitudes are formed, and these may not be compatible 
with the originally reported attitudes. People may find themselves with conflicting 
attitudes, for instance predicting that the relationship would last, when the originally 
reported attitude towards the relationship was negative.
The results from such experiments allow for two interpretations. Which inter-
pretation is preferred depends on whether we think that the attitude reported as a 
result of the reason-giving exercise is ‘real’, that is, whether it is an attitude the per-
son genuinely has towards her relationship. If the attitude defended with reasons is 
not real, then the phenomenon demonstrates an obvious failure of self-attribution: 
people are mistaken about what their attitudes are (attitude error). If the attitude 
defended with reasons is genuine, the phenomenon demonstrates the instability of 
people’s attitudes, showing that such attitudes can shift quite dramatically in a lit-
tle amount of  time (attitude change) and in virtue of how they are elicited. These 
two interpretations parallel the choice error and choice change interpretations of the 
experimental results from choice-blindness studies.
If only the initial reports are reports of people’s ‘real’ attitudes, the reason-giving 
exercise is exposed as misleading. If the latter reports are reports of genuine but 
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newly acquired attitudes, then people do not make attribution errors as such, but 
their attitudes are shown to be unstable and vulnerable to manipulation. As in the 
consumer choice study, participants are not aware of some of the factors that caused 
them to adopt new attitudes (including the evidence manipulation that is part of the 
experimental setting). In attitude error, people do not know what their attitudes are. 
In attitude change, people are not mistaken about what their attitudes are. However, 
they are unaware that their attitudes changed and ignore what caused the change.
If we see choice blindness as a natural extension of the dual-attitude cases, the 
phenomenon could be more aptly called ‘dual choices’. Consider the following 
study. Participants were asked to choose between two pictures of individual faces 
they did not know, on the basis of the attractiveness of the faces (Johansson et al. 
2005). Then participants were asked to give reasons for their choice, but the face 
presented to them as their choice was not the face they previously chose but the 
one they rejected. Most people failed to notice that their choice had been reversed. 
They went on to offer reasons for choosing the face that was not their original choice 
(Johansson et al. 2008).6
As in the case of dual attitudes, depending on whether we think the preferences 
the agent ascribes to herself when she gives reasons are ‘real’ preferences, the phe-
nomenon points to either an obvious failure of self-knowledge (choice error), or 
a demonstration of the instability of choices (choice change). In the former case, 
agents make a mistake about what their choices are. In the latter case, agents change 
their mind in the course of the experiment about what their choice is. Which inter-
pretation is most plausible?
In the case of the experiment on faces, Johansson and colleagues embrace a 
choice error interpretation, suggesting that participants are (literally) blind to their 
choices. However, when they present the results of other choice-blindness experi-
ments, such as those concerning moral and political preferences (which we will 
6 The choice-blindness experiment with faces featured 120 participants (70 female, 50 male) who were 
presented with pairs of photographs of female faces. They were asked to select which they found the 
most attractive. On some trials, having made the choice, participants were immediately asked for reasons 
for their choice. This was the non-manipulated set-up. In the manipulated set-up, a double-card ploy was 
used allowing the experimenter to switch one face for another, which meant that the face presented to 
the participant as the selected face was not the selected face but the one that had just been rejected a few 
seconds earlier. Each participant completed a sequence of fifteen pairs of faces, and three of those fifteen 
were manipulated such that the opposite face was presented as their choice. The switches occurred at the 
same position in the sequence for every participant, and participants were always asked to state the rea-
sons for their choices. Three time-conditions were included, one with two seconds deliberation time, one 
with five seconds, and one in which participants were free to take as much time as they wanted. Two sim-
ilarity of faces conditions were included, one high and one low. Detections were classified as concurrent 
if they occurred during the task, and as retrospective if they occurred during a post-experimental inter-
view (Johansson et al. 2008: p. 117). The results were as follows: of 354 manipulated trials, 46 (13%) 
were concurrently detected. When participants were given free deliberation time and low similarity faces 
(and this is where one might expect high detection), no more than 27% of trials were detected. Johans-
son and colleagues found no significant differences in the detection rate across the two second and five 
second time conditions, though they found a higher detection rate in the free time condition as compared 
with the fixed time conditions. They found no differences in detection rate between the high similarity 
and low similarity conditions, nor any significant differences in detection rate depending on sex or age 
(Johansson et al. 2008: pp. 117–18).
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discuss in the next section), they talk about preferences being reversed and choice 
blindness showing that we are not set in our ways and can change our minds, which 
suggests a choice change interpretation.
Some have argued that choice change is the best interpretation for the experi-
ment on faces too. Dominic Lopes claims that, in the manipulation condition of the 
experiment, participants give reasons for what has become their new choice (Lopes 
2014). For Lopes, it is no surprise that preferences are changeable and amenable 
to manipulation. The newly ascribed preferences are real and are newly formed as 
a result of the participants’ beliefs about the choices they made (Lopes 2014: pp. 
29–30). Given that by and large participants do not detect the manipulation, they 
come to believe that they chose the face that is presented to them. Participants do 
not realise that their preference shifted. In the manipulation condition, reasons are 
often given in the past tense: “I thought she had more personality in a way”, “I chose 
her because she smiled”, or “I chose her because she had dark hair” (Johansson et al. 
2005, p. 118). That strongly suggests that people believe that the choice they defend 
with reasons was their choice all along, failing to appreciate the role of the manipu-
lation in determining their change of choice. In Lopes’ view, the participants’ belief 
that the choice presented to them was the one they had previously made determines 
the choice they ascribe to themselves when they give reasons.
Perhaps subjects in the manipulation condition changed their preference as a 
result of their choice. Since they did not notice the manipulation, they believed 
that they chose the displayed face, and that fact determines their preference. 
On this hypothesis, […] subjects’ reasons do not accord with their initial pref-
erence as revealed by their initial choice, but they do accord with their even-
tual preference as determined by what they took to be their choice. (Lopes 
2014, pp. 29–30)
One important difference between the second attitude in the dual-attitude studies 
and the second choice in the choice-blindness cases is that the latter seems to be 
predictive of future behaviour, at least to an extent. When asked again to choose 
between the same faces at a later time (Johansson et al. 2008), those in the manipu-
lated condition chose the face they provided reasons for choosing, and not the face 
they had originally chosen. This suggests that reasons cement preferences (Lopes 
2014, p. 30). However, reasons follow blindly along preferences instead of regulat-
ing them (Lopes 2014, p. 30), pace Moran, and this is where the overlap is between 
the phenomenon of confabulation and that of choice blindness. A similar idea is 
argued for in Dan Ariely’s influential research, which is captured by the slogan: 
Action determines, not just reveals, preferences (Ariely and Norton 2008).
One might wonder why in the case of appraisals of one’s romantic relationship 
the most recent attitude is not predictive of one’s future behaviour whereas in the 
case of the preference for faces the most recent choice is reflected in one’s future 
commitments. If reasons cement preferences, then the most recent attitude towards 
the relationship should be the one shaping behaviour as it was defended with reasons 
in the course of the experiments.
Here is something that might explain the discrepancy. First, the context of the 
appraisals seems to matter. In the relationship study, people evaluate one important, 
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defining aspect of their lives (the relationship with the person they are dating), 
which affects their wellbeing and their conception of themselves. It is overwhelm-
ingly plausible that participants came to the experiment with pre-existing attitudes 
about their romantic relationships and romantic partners.
In the faces study, people express a preference about the attractiveness of a stran-
ger’s face, which they have never seen before and they will likely never see again. 
Thus, participants’ choices are just an expression of their aesthetic preferences as 
applied to people’s faces, and given the set-up of the experiment, it is very unlikely 
that there were pre-existing attitudes towards the attractiveness of those faces. It is 
possible then that the reason-giving exercise cements attitudes and preferences about 
an object of evaluation when there are no pre-existing attitudes or preferences about 
that object of evaluation, and the agent has no personal investment in the evaluation 
itself.
We shall come back to the idea that reasons cement preferences in Sects. 4 and 5.
4  Moral and political preferences
To sum up, we already saw that in the typical choice-blindness scenario, a person 
is asked to choose between A and B, and chooses A. Moments later, she is asked to 
give reasons for her choice. Due to a subtle manipulation, her choice is presented to 
her as having been B. In most cases, the person does not detect that the object of her 
choice has been switched and goes on to provide reasons for choosing B.
Interestingly, the way agents offer reasons for choice B does not differ signifi-
cantly from the way they offer reasons for their choices when there is no manipula-
tion.7 In choice error, agents make a mistake as to what their choice is (they say it is 
B but it really is A). The request for an explanation of why they chose B leads agents 
to misidentify their choices and give reasons for B. In choice change, agents know 
what their current choice is, B, but fail to realise the B was not their choice all along. 
What the experiments show is that agents are neither aware of the instability of their 
choices nor of the manipulation that caused their choices to change.
The choice change interpretation seems to fit well with choice blindness apply-
ing to moral and political statements people are asked to agree or disagree with. In 
this context, the failure to detect the manipulation causes greater concern than in the 
context of consumer choice or aesthetic judgements. It is perhaps understandable 
that participants’ preferences about the flavour of jams or the attractiveness of stran-
gers’ faces can be easily manipulated, because people may not come to make those 
choices with existing preferences and may not care very much about the quality of 
jams or attractiveness comparisons among faces never seen before. However, prefer-
ences about moral and political issues just before a major election (e.g., “It is more 
important for a society to promote the welfare of the citizens than to protect their 
7 The way the agent provides reasons is understood across five dimensions in a comparative linguistic 
analysis, specifically: uncertainty, specificity, emotionality, deceit, and complexity (see Johansson et al. 
2006: pp. 678–84 for discussion).
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personal integrity”) are expected to be more stable, and they may even count as self-
defining for those agents who see themselves as engaged in politics.
Participants in the studies by Hall and colleagues (Hall et al. 2012, 2013) were 
asked to fill in what the authors describe as a ‘self-transforming’ questionnaire on 
either foundational moral principles (condition one) or on currently topical moral 
issues (condition two). This happened just before a general election in Sweden, at 
a time when even people who were not so interested in politics were likely to think 
about these kinds of issues in their daily lives. Participants had to rate their agree-
ment with a statement using a 9-point scale, and then explain their ratings to the 
experimenter. The transforming part of the experiment was that two of the state-
ments read out by the experimenter were actually the reverse of the statements origi-
nally rated. The rating given was kept the same, but the statement was reversed, so 
participants were in effect presented with the opposite of the opinion they expressed 
earlier. The experiment was designed to see whether participants would be led to 
endorse a view that was in opposition to the one they had just stated.
Once the participant had read the reversed statement, an experimenter would 
summarise their view back to them with a question: “So you don’t agree that [state-
ment]?” or “So you do agree that [statement]?”. This mechanism was in place to 
ensure participants were sure of what they were committing themselves to. The 
manipulated trials were understood as corrected when participants noticed some-
thing strange immediately (spontaneous detection) or claimed that something was 
amiss only later, at the time of debriefing (retrospective correction). Trials were 
understood as accepted when the participant showed no sign of having noticed that 
the reversal of the opinion they originally expressed was being fed back to them.
In the first condition, in which the questionnaire was on foundational moral prin-
ciples, around a third of the trials were spontaneously detected, and a further 8% 
were retrospectively detected after the experiment. In condition two, nearly 50% of 
the manipulations were spontaneously detected, but very few participants claimed to 
detect the manipulations retrospectively. Framed for individuals, 69% of participants 
accepted at least one of the two reversed statements (Hall et  al. 2012, p. 4). The 
manipulation was performed very subtly, so even participants who noticed some-
thing strange did not detect the manipulation as such but declared that they must 
have previously misread or misunderstood the statement.
Interestingly, there was no correlation between self-evaluation of strength of 
moral conviction and correction, so those “participants who believed themselves to 
hold strong moral opinions in general were no more likely to correct the manipula-
tions” (Hall et al. 2012, p. 3). And though there was a positive relationship between 
level of agreement and spontaneous detection, “a full third (31.3%) of all manipu-
lated trials rated at the endpoints of the scale (1 or 9) remained undetected, which 
shows that not even extreme levels of agreement or disagreement with statements 
guarantees detection” (Hall et  al. 2012, p. 3). However, those participants who 
claimed to be politically active were more likely to spontaneously detect the manip-
ulation in condition two as compared with politically active participants in condi-
tion one. From this we learn that those who identified as politically active were less 
likely to be manipulated into misidentifying their attitudes or were less likely to have 
their attitudes changed. It would be interesting to examine whether there are any 
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other individual differences that can explain the correction/acceptance rates among 
participants.
In the choice change interpretation, the participant changes her moral or political 
attitude as a result of the experimental manipulation. The participant really believes 
that she scored the moral or political statement read to her in the second stage of the 
experiment. She endorses that attitude and offers genuinely held reasons for it. But 
what can explain the result that the manipulation is more likely to be detected by the 
politically active participants? If Lopes is right that second-order beliefs about origi-
nal choices determine preferences, then in detection cases one of two things might 
be occurring. The first is that politically active participants are resistant to form-
ing a false second-order belief about their initial preference (“I chose B”), perhaps 
because they came to the experiment with fixed attitudes about the issues at hand. 
Alternatively, participants form the second-order belief about the preference they 
originally stated, but this does not change their preferences, again, because of their 
having fixed attitudes about the issues at hand. Either way, their behaviour can be 
explained by the fact that their political attitude was already cemented at the point 
of the original choice and thus resistant to manipulation. People who are politically 
active may be more likely than people who are not to find themselves in situations 
where they give reasons for their attitudes prior to participating in the experiment. 
If it is true that reasons cement preferences, then this might explain why they do not 
experience choice change.8
The conclusion Hall and colleagues draw from the outcomes of the self-trans-
forming questionnaire is that people change in the course of the experiment. Opin-
ions can be “instantly [reversed]” through change blindness.9 Similarly to the case 
of attitude shifts we reviewed in Sect. 3.2, the experimental results can be seen as 
a demonstration of the extreme instability of people’s attitudes. The agent’s attitude 
shifts between the time when she is first asked to rate her agreement with the moral 
or political statement and the time when she is asked to provide reasons for her 
rating. The change is radical and happens very quickly. What are the implications 
for self-knowledge? The agent preserves her capacity to identify her attitudes but 
remains unaware of the fact that her current attitudes were not her attitudes all along. 
There is no obvious reason to believe that the agent’s behaviour indicated a fail-
ure of self-knowledge if we identify self-knowledge with correct self-attribution of 
attitudes. Negative implications for self-knowledge would apply only if we thought 
that self-knowledge depended on the stability of the agent’s preferences and their 
resistance to manipulation, which would make for a very demanding account of self-
knowledge, extending the notion considerably beyond correct self-attribution.
Different from the choice-blindness experiments on consumer choice and faces, 
the interpretation focusing on the instability of preferences in the case of moral and 
8 It is important to notice that, in later applications of the choice-blindness paradigm to political prefer-
ences, the result that politically active participants are more resistant to manipulation has not been rep-
licated (see Strandberg et al. 2018) and political activism made no difference to manipulation detection.
9 They suggest that “moral decision or judgment is reached through intuition, and the reasons or argu-
ments for the position are mainly constructed through post hoc confabulation” (Hall et al. 2012, p. 5).
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political attitudes is at least implicitly endorsed by the experimenters. They imply 
that in the course of the experiment a new preference is formed due to the manipula-
tion and they also draw some interesting practical conclusions from this for the reli-
ability of opinion polls and the nature of political debate.
5  The advantages of the preference change interpretation
Preference change sounds like a more plausible interpretation of the empirical evi-
dence gathered in some of the choice-blindness studies than choice misattribution. 
We are not in a position to offer an argument for the general conclusion that choice 
change should replace choice error in every case, as we suspect that the results 
obtained under the choice-blindness paradigm resist one overarching interpreta-
tion. However, here we offer reasons in favour of choice change that apply to at least 
some cases of choice blindness.
A first reason in favour of preference change is methodological. It is preferable to 
take people’s reports seriously unless there are good reasons to challenge them. This 
does not mean, of course, that people are infallible when they talk about their men-
tal lives. Rather, it means that, if they report with apparent sincerity to prefer one 
option to another and are prepared to defend the option they claim to prefer with rea-
sons, then it is implausible, all else equal, to think that they are massively deceived. 
If a person tells us that she prefers cinnamon-apple jam to grapefruit jam and gives 
us good reasons for her preference, on what basis should we challenge her report? 
The fact that she expressed a different preference earlier is not a good-enough reason 
to doubt the authenticity of her attribution. After all, we tolerate preference change 
outside of the laboratory (or the supermarket), even when the person doesn’t know 
why her preferences changed.
A second reason for preference change comes from the evidence reviewed above. 
The option agents claim to prefer when they are asked to defend their choice with 
reasons is predictive of their future behaviour. This suggests that the preference 
change interpretation is not merely supported by the participants’ verbal reports, but 
also by the way in which the preference self-attributed in that report, and defended 
with reasons, shapes their future verbal and non-verbal behaviour. The report proves 
to be more than a momentary glitch in people’s self-awareness. This also suggests 
that manipulating preferences can have lasting effects which is concerning. In the 
choice-blindness literature people’s future behaviour is aligned with their new atti-
tudes or preferences which is evidence that their new attitudes and preferences are 
not just ‘empty talk’. One of the most recent choice-blindness studies (Strandberg 
et al. 2018) examines in detail the longevity of the preferences induced by the exper-
imenters using the self-transforming questionnaire. Participants are led to form new 
preferences about health, education, or the environment, and a relationship is found 
between the persistence of the new preference and the amount of reason giving the 
agent engaged in at the time of justifying the alleged choice.
How does this happen? Participants were  asked to rate a political statement 
(e.g., “All elementary school students should be offered free homework assistance 
regardless of their performance and family situation”) and then in some cases they 
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were given the false feedback that their rating (e.g., strongly agree) applied to the 
opposite statement (e.g., “No elementary school students should be offered free 
homework assistance regardless of their performance and family situation”). Of 
the manipulated trials, about 50% were not detected and so the participants did not 
correct the false feedback and accepted the rating that was reported back to them 
by the experimenter. Participants were divided into two groups: in one group they 
just acknowledged the rating (Acknowledge Condition), in the other group they were 
asked to provide reasons for it (Confabulation Condition). The attitude change lasted 
when participants were asked about it straight after the manipulation, and also when 
they were asked about it a week after the manipulation. In both cases, the attitude 
change was much more pronounced if the participants had been in the Confabula-
tion Condition. No significant attitude change was observed for those statements for 
which the feedback had not been manipulated. This confirms the idea that reasons 
cement preferences.10 
On the one hand, absent any manipulation, participants gave the same 
responses throughout the experiment, clearly indicating they had a stable set 
of political attitudes. On the other hand, the same participants exhibited large 
lasting attitude shifts after having accepted the false feedback. (Strandberg 
et al. 2018, p. 1395)
In addition to the reasons above, we should also think about how the results of the 
choice-blindness studies, interpreted in the light of choice change, fit into psycho-
logical research on the determinants of human behaviour more generally. Although 
the ease with which agents are manipulated into changing their choices is surprising, 
it is definitely not surprising that agents’ attitudes are subject to change.
Years of psychological research in different research programmes have dem-
onstrated that environmental cues have a more significant effect on our behaviour 
than we realise. Some obvious examples powerfully illustrating this include the 
controversial literature on situationism and obedience to authority (Darley and Bat-
son 1973; Milgram 1963). Suggesting that agents may change their choices due to 
manipulation is compatible with a wealth of independent research pointing to the 
elusiveness and fluidity of the self. Our selves are fluid in the sense that it is illu-
sory to believe that we have fixed personality traits, strong values, or stable attitudes 
and preferences that are reliably predictive of our behaviour. Further, our selves are 
elusive because their fluidity makes it especially hard for us to have accurate beliefs 
about what our selves are like.
10 One might wonder to what extent the choice-change interpretation is compatible with the thesis that 
reasons cement preferences. Choice change tells us that agents are vulnerable to manipulation in some 
choice contexts: agents can be made to change their choices without becoming aware of such changes. 
The thesis that reasons cement preferences does not tell us that agents cannot change their choices but 
simply tells us that in some choice contexts agents’ choices become more stable and more resistant to 
change than in other contexts. What makes a difference is whether agents provide reasons for the choices 
they make. Providing reasons for one’s choice seems to cement the preferences underlying that choice, 
effectively change-proofing one’s choice. More research is needed to ascertain in what circumstances and 
to what extent reasons cement preferences.
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6  Conclusions and implications
We saw that there are two competing accounts of the results of the choice-blind-
ness experiments. What interpretation we favour will determine how we see 
choice blindness. If choice error is correct, and choice blindness is primarily a 
mistake in self-ascription, then people can be genuinely blind to their choices and 
this represents a fairly dramatic departure from self-knowledge. If choice change 
is correct, and people have dual choices, then people are blind to what causes 
them to change their minds about things. They do not realise that their prefer-
ences can be easily influenced by external factors and they assume that their pref-
erences are more stable than they actually are. Choice error and choice change 
converge on the fact that agents are misled about the rationality of their choice-
making process. However, unless we believe that in order to have self-knowledge 
people need not only to make correct self-ascriptions, but also to have stable 
preferences or be resistant to manipulation, self-knowledge is not threatened by 
choice change.
Why should we take choice change seriously? First, it is a good policy to take 
people’s reports at face value unless we have good reasons to believe that they 
intend to deceive us. If a person gives us good reasons to endorse her choice of 
cinnamon-apple jam over grapefruit jam, on what basis should we challenge her 
report? The fact that she made an inconsistent choice earlier is not a good enough 
reason to doubt the authenticity of her attribution.
Second, even if we were in the business of discriminating between ‘real’ and 
‘fake’ choices, it is significant that in the study examining the choice-blindness 
effect on faces and moral and political preferences people’s future behaviour is 
aligned with their most recent attitudes or choices which is evidence that their 
most recent attitudes and choices are not just temporary effects of the experimen-
tal manipulation.
In addition to the reasons above, we should also think about how the results of the 
studies on the choice-blindness effect, interpreted in the light of choice change, fit 
into psychological research on the determinants of human behaviour more generally. 
Although the ease with which people are manipulated into changing their attitudes 
and choices is surprising, it is definitely not surprising that people’s attitudes and 
choices are subject to change. Psychological research has demonstrated that envi-
ronmental cues have a more significant effect on our behaviour than we realise. The 
influence of such cues would have been difficult to identify in the wild but is obvious 
in the lab, as the controversial literature on situationism and obedience to authority 
powerfully illustrates (Darley and Batson 1973; Milgram 1963). This has led to the 
conclusion that behaviour in general and moral practices in particular are mainly 
due to features of the agent’s situational context as opposed to the agent’s charac-
ter (e.g., Doris 2002). Thus, the idea that people may change their choices due to 
manipulation is compatible with a wealth of independent research pointing to the 
fluidity of the self. Our selves are fluid in the sense that it is illusory to believe that 
we have fixed personality traits, strong values, or stable attitudes and preferences 
that are reliably predictive of our future behaviour.
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If choice change is the correct interpretation of at least some of the psychologi-
cal studies we reviewed, what are the implications for the centrality of choice in our 
self-conceptions? Our suggestion is that we should all strive to be better informed 
about the subtle cues that may influence or even determine choices and attitudes, so 
as to regain some control over the way in which, and the extent to which, our choices 
and attitudes can change. If we discover that being told that we chose cinnamon-
apple jam makes us very likely to believe that we chose cinnamon-apple jam and 
to genuinely endorse that choice as ours in the future, then it is in our interests to 
pay more attention to, and sometimes challenge, attributions of choices to ourselves 
made by third parties. After all, those attributions have been shown to have seri-
ous power: they can be a device to make us disregard and even reverse pre-existing 
preferences. It may not matter when the choice concerns something as trivial as the 
flavour of jams, but it is much more significant when our moral values and political 
preferences are at stake.
Psychological research highlighting incoherence and instability in our behaviour 
can be disheartening. However, it is also empowering, and it is in this spirit that we 
have argued for the choice change interpretation. Understanding what goes on in the 
experiments on the choice-blindness effect gives us insight into the measures we 
can take to enhance our stability and coherence as agents. Understanding the ways 
in which our preferences are likely to shift as a result of manipulation gives us the 
means to compensate for our limitations as agents by becoming more aware of those 
situations where such limitations can be taken advantage of. Moreover, understand-
ing that reason giving contributes to cementing our attitudes and choices gives us 
further opportunities to ensure that our most cherished commitments will shape our 
choices in the future. Verbalising and sharing reasons for our commitments render 
such commitments more stable and make us less vulnerable to manipulation.
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